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PROTECTING THIRD PARTY PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN RICO FORFEITURES
INTRODUCTION

In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act
(the Act),' which allows the government to seize property belonging
to criminal defendants as a penalty under its Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) section.' While this new type of
property forfeiture3 provides the government with a much needed
weapon for its fight against organized crime, it also violates the
rights of third party property owners and challenges traditional concepts of property law4 and due process.5
I. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. Supp. V 1988).
2. RICO, Title IX of the Act, has as its purpose "'the elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., IstSess., at 76 (1969). 18 U.S.C. § 1962 makes it
unlawful for any person to invest any income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt in any enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,
to maintain any interest in such an enterprise, or to participate in operating it. Section 1963(a)
provides for forfeiture of any interest affording a source of influence over any enterprise in
violation of § 1962.
Similar forfeiture provisions were enacted under Title II of the Controlled Substance Act
of 1970, also known as the Continuing Criminal Enterprise section, P.L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 848 et seq.).
3. Criminal forfeiture must be distinguished from civil forfeiture in the context of the
RICO statute. Criminal forfeiture functions as a penalty on the criminal defendant and depends upon a determination of guilt. Civil forfeiture, on the other hand, functions as a damage
remedy, allowing for treble damages under 18 U.S. C. § 1964. (The treble damage provision
for civil RICO has led to a flood of litigation and commentary. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 2,
at 80-81). While there were only 19 civil RICO suits filed in 1981, there were 959 suits filed in
the first six months of 1988. Mansnerus, As Racketeering Law Expands, So Does Pressure To
Rein It In, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1989, at E4, col.1 [hereinafter As Racketeering Law
Expands].
4. For example, the Act allows for temporary restraint of property belonging to bona
fide purchasers, who are traditionally afforded special protection from such invasions. It can
also be argued that restraint and forfeiture of property held by an uncharged third party is a
compensable taking. See TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-3 (2d ed. 1988). Even
temporary takings for public benefit are compensable. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
5. The due process clause of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
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As amended in 1984,' the Act provides for post-indictment, ex

parte restraining orders in an effort to prevent defendants who anticipate forfeiture from transferring or concealing their assets while
awaiting trial." Under the Act the government may restrain property
belonging to a person or entity who acquired the property from the
criminal defendant, even those who obtained the property without
knowledge of the underlying crime or the government's interest. By

allowing the government to restrain property of innocent third parproperty be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
There is also general agreement among commentators that the Act is overly broad and
subject to potential abuse by prosecutors. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 978 (1987); Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis
of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's
Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 305, 306 (1980).
RICO has received wide coverage in the media in connection with several celebrated cases
where forfeiture was obtained against drug king pins, racketeers, and white collar criminals.
As Racketeering Law Expands, supra note 3; Crovitz, RICO's Broken Commandments, Wall
St. J., Jan. 26, 1989, at 14, col. 2; Lynch, RICO Law Is Too Much of a "Good Thing,"
Newsday, Jan. II, 1989, at 57, col. 1; Sontag, New RICO Use: A Step Too Far? Nat'l L.J.,
Nov. 28, 1988, at I, Col. 4.
6. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). As
amended, section 1963 provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall
forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law (I) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962;
(2) any (A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence
over;
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of in violation of section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than
the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter
shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a
hearing pursuant to subsection (I) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such
property who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that
the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), (c) (Supp. V 1988) (emphasis added).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (Supp. V 1988).
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ties without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, the statute
violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
After a brief discussion of the history and purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act, this note will analyze how the Act violates the due process clause of the Constitution. It will conclude that
the Act should be amended to provide third parties whose property is
subject to RICO forfeiture notice and an opportunity to be heard
within "a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"' - no
more than 90 days from the date a temporary or ex parte restraining
order is issued and in a full adversarial hearing.
I.

A.

HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE ACT

HistoricalBackground of the Organized Crime Control Act

Criminal forfeiture is a radical departure from the traditional,
200-year old statutory mandate that "[n]o conviction or judgment
shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate." 9 That
mandate was enacted in 1790 as an expansion of the constitutional
prohibitions against bills of attainder 0 and "corruption of blood"
forfeiture.1 In passing the RICO forfeiture provision, Congress real8. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
9. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3563 (Law. Co-op. 1979) (repealed by Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 § 235(a)(1). "[Tihe First Congress, by Act of April 20, 1790,
abolished forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood, including in treason cases." S. REP. No.
617, supra note 2, at 80. From that time until the passage of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, no federal statute has provided for criminal forfeiture, Id., except forfeiture of
the property of Confederate sympathizers, which was upheld by the Supreme Court on the
basis of the War Powers. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 241 (E.D. Cal. 1982)
(citing Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (I I Wall) 268 (1871)). See also A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal RICO Legislation and Litigation, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST., at 73
(1985) [hereinafter A.B.A. Report].
10. Bills of attainder were known to feudal law and amounted to the pronouncement of
legal death, taking away all rights and property of traitors and felons. The Constitution prohibits Congress from passing bills of attainder. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. In the United
States, bills of attainder include any "legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (1867). For an act to be unconstitutional
as a bill of attainder today, it must be specifically directed at an individual or identifiable
group. Id. See also Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (statute allowed for confiscation of
property belonging to individuals who were found to be communists).
II. "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3, cl. 2. Corruption of blood refers to the ancient
practice of taking the entire estate of a convicted felon; the criminal sanction would effectively
disinherit the defendant's heirs, who may have had no connection to the crime other than their
blood relation. 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 381-389 (1775).
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ized that it impliedly repealed 18 U.S.C. § 3563.12 Furthermore, because the RICO forfeiture provision allows for restraint of property
without a trial and also reaches persons who are not connected to the
underlying crime, it bears a striking resemblance to a bill of attainder and may be contrary to the United States Constitution. Before
1970, in order to punish the criminal and confiscate any property
used in the commission of the crime, the government was forced to
bring two separate actions: one in personam action against the defendant in the district where the crime was committed 3 and a separate in rem action against the property itself in the district where the
property is located." Now, under the RICO statute, the government
can accomplish both of these goals in one action.' 5 This was one of
the objectives of Congress in passing the 1970 Act; by bringing the
two actions together, Congress intended to make the prosecution of

organized crime more efficient."6
It is important to note the distinction between in personam and
in rem jurisdiction because the two had previously been considered
incompatible. In the former, the innocence of the property owner is a
complete defense against any penalty,17 whereas in the latter his or
her innocence is irrelevant."' In creating criminal forfeiture, Congress has attempted to merge these two conflicting concepts. As a
result, an innocent property owner may, in effect, be penalized as
part of a criminal proceeding to which he is not a party.
B.

Purpose of the Act: Hitting Organized Crime Where It Hurts

By 1969, it was the consensus that the existing mechanisms for
combating organized crime were hopelessly ineffective.1 9 Organized
crime had become highly sophisticated and diversified; racketeering
enterprises increasingly used their money and power to infiltrate and
12. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 2, at 80.
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
14. 28 U.S.C. §1395(b) (1982).
15. The RICO statute allows the government to confiscate the defendant's property in
any court where there is in personam jurisdiction over the defendant - in a court that may
not otherwise have jurisdiction over the third party or his property. S. REP. No. 617, supra
note 2, at 79-80. The expanded notion of in personam jurisdiction imposes an extra burden on
the third party, who now may be forced to appear in a foreign jurisdiction to defend his right
to property purchased from a criminal defendant.
16. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. at 193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (98 stat.) 3376; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 79-80.
17. United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
18. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
19. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 2, at 76-78.
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corrupt legitimate businesses, unions and the political system: 20
What is needed here, the [Senate Judiciary] committee believes,
are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but
also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation.
In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic
power itself, and the attack must take place on all available
fronts.3
The legislative attack on organized crime began with the creation of a new criminal offense: the Act made it unlawful to invest
funds derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" or to maintain or acquire an interest in any enterprise operated through such a
pattern. 2 In order to establish a pattern of racketeering, the Act
requires at least two predicate acts which may include murder, arson, gambling, extortion and mail fraud, inter alia.3
The 91st Congress created criminal forfeiture specifically to address racketeering and organized drug dealing.2 4 It accomplished this
by, among other things, providing the federal courts with jurisdiction
to enter restraining orders "in connection with any property or other
interest subject to forfeiture. . . .,,' Congress felt that the prosecution could be defeated in its attempt to preserve the defendant's forfeitable assets unless restraint was quickly available. For example, a
defendant could have transferred title and possession of his airplane
to a confederate in order to avoid eventual forfeiture. The availability of a temporary restraining order without notice to the defendant
or third party means that the confederate could be barred from further transferring the plane yet another time, perhaps even to a bona
fide purchaser. In United States v. Long,26 the defendant turned over
title to his airplane to his attorneys, who then attempted to sell it in
South America. The issuance of a restraining order allowed the gov20. Id.
21. Id. at 79.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(A) (Supp. V 1988) defines "racketeering activity" as "any act
or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in
obscene matter or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year .... The remainder of
section 1961(I) adds various federal offenses, including mail and wire fraud, securities fraud
and narcotics offenses.
24. S. REP. No. 225 supra note 16, at 194.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1982).
26. 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
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ernment to preserve the airplane for eventual forfeiture.

However, the Act provided no guidelines for the issuance of restraining orders.2 Courts, without explicit guidelines, inevitably and
overwhelmingly required the government to meet the same standards

that they had used for decades - those governing civil preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders.2 8 Courts have consistently held in RICO cases that due process required post-restraint,
pre-trial hearings. 29 Moreover, a prosecutor seeking to restrain prop-

erty was not permitted to rely solely on the indictment" and often
bore the burden of demonstrating that it was likely to prevail at the
criminal trial, i.e., that it was likely to convince a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt that (a) the defendant was guilty and (b) the property was subject to forfeiture. 31 Even if the government could establish these factors to a judge's satisfaction at an ex parte proceeding,

the courts did not generally allow the temporary orders to continue
past the ten-day period allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce27.

WASHINGTON STAFF, ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING

SECTION,

U.S. DE-

(RICO): A
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 117 (2d rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter RICO Manual].
28. United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) vacated and remanded 468
U.S. 1206 (1984) [hereinafter Crozier /];United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. Mandel, 408 F.
Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982). See also
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 95-96.
29. See supra note 28; see also Note, RICO Post-Indictment Restraining Orders: The
Process Due Defendants, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1162, 1166 (1985) (authored by M. Jacobson)
[hereinafter Note, The Process Due Defendants]. But see United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F.
Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
30. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 196. Congress did not intend that the courts
should look beyond the indictment or require the prosecution to produce additional evidence
regarding the merits of the case. The theory was if an indictment was sufficient to restrain a
defendant's liberty, it should be sufficient to support restraint of his property. Id. at 202-203.
See also United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1986). In order for the government
to request restraint or forfeiture, the specific property must be identified in the indictment and
there must have been a finding of probable cause that the property is, in fact, forfeitable in the
event of conviction. "No judgement of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal proceeding
unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property
subject to forfeiture." FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2). Notwithstanding the implications in the legislative history, courts refused to defer to the findings of the grand jury, holding that, while the
indictment may serve as notice to the defendant, the opportunity for a prompt hearing was still
necessary. Crozier 1, 674 F.2d at 1298; Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 618; See Long, 654 F.2d at 915.
Some courts insisted that Congress must have intended such a hearing. See, e.g., Veon, 538 F.
Supp. at 244-45, where the court found itself "obligated to construe the statute so as to avoid
resolution of those [constitutional] issues. . . . This can readily be accomplished by finding that
implicit in the statutory scheme is a requirement for a timely adversary hearing."
31. Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 618; Long, 654 F.2d at 915; Crozier 1, 674 F.2d at 1298.
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

RACKETEER

INFLUENCE AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
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dure unless a full adversarial hearing was held.32 Prosecutors were
also concerned about the imposition of the Federal Rules of Evidence on the pre-trial hearings."
C.

The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 19843"

The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 amended the RICO

statutes and was designed to ease the court-imposed limitations on
pre-trial restraint by making the forfeiture law tougher and more
explicit.3 5 First, the definition of assets subject to forfeiture was expanded to include all proceeds of the illegal conduct, in addition to
property used in the crime itself.3 " Second, a provision for forfeiture
of "substitute" assets was added, allowing a penalty to be imposed

on the defendant even when the original forfeitable property had
been placed beyond the reach of the law.37 Third, a provision al32. See Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617; Long, 654 F.2d at 915; Crozier I, 674 F.2d at 1298;
Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 245.
33. Evidentiary rules can pose debilitating hurdles for the prosecution. In Veon, 538 F.
Supp. 237, the federal district court ordered that a full adversarial hearing was required by
due process. By also directing that the Federal Rules of Evidence applied to such a hearing,
the court forced the government to expose its evidence and strategy prior to the trial if it
wanted to preserve the defendant's property for eventual forfeiture. Unable to present hearsay
evidence, the prosecutor was faced with a "Catch 22" situation: risk premature exposure of his
trial strategy and possibly the lives of his witnesses, or allow the defendant to dissipate or
conceal his forfeitable assets.
Interestingly, the attorney for the government, in a "simple but creative maneuver," filed
a notice of lis pendens in an attempt to circumvent the court's dissolution of the restraining
order. The defendant moved to expunge the lis pendens, and the court agreed. Veon, 538 F.
Supp. at 276.
34. § 301 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
stat. 1837, provides that Title III of the Act may be cited as the "Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act."
35. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 192-93.
36. Id. at 199. "First, the scope of property subject to forfeiture is, in two important
respects, too limited. The RICO statute, which was designed to deprive racketeers of the economic power generated by and used to sustain organized criminal activity has been interpreted
by several courts so as to prevent the criminal forfeiture of a defendant's ill-gotten profits, even
though other of his interests used or acquired in violation of the RICO statute would be forfeitable." Id. at 194 (referring to the results in United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
37. Subsection (n) of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act provides:
If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omission
of the defendant (I) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the courts;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without
difficulty;
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lowed for pre-indictment restraining orders, subject to a prompt adversarial hearing. 8 This meant that the government could obtain a
freeze on assets in the hands of third parties even before an indictment was handed down, but only after the third party had been
given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Despite the generally negative impact of the amendments on
third parties," the 1984 legislation did enact a provision that adds
important protection for third party due process rights.4 The original procedure embodied in the 1970 Act provided only one remedy

for a bona fide purchaser or other third party with an interest in the
property subject to forfeiture: a petition to the Attorney General for
remission or mitigation subsequent to the conviction and order of
forfeiture. 41 In 1984 Congress added a provision for judicial resolution of third party claims. 2 As of 1984, an aggrieved party may

petition for a hearing after conviction and recover his property if he
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he qualifies as
a bona fide purchaser under the statute.4 3 Nowhere, however, does
the law provide for a prompt hearing after entry of a pre-trial restraining order. In fact, a third party is not only barred from inter-

vening in the criminal proceeding, but is explicitly prohibited from
the court shall order forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the
value of any property described in paragraphs (1)through (5).
18 U.S.C. § 1963(n).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B), (d)(2). The pre-indictment order or injunction pursuant
to subsection (d)(I)(B) is only granted after notice to third parties have been given notice and
opportunity to be heard, and is limited to no more than 90 days, unless extended by the court
for good cause. The temporary restraining order under subsection (d)(2) is without notice or
hearing, but limited to 10 days, and provides for a hearing at the earliest possible time.
39. For example, the expansion of forfeitable assets to include proceeds derived from the
illegal conduct increased the likelihood that assets belonging to third parties would be brought
within the sweep of the statute.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) (Supp. V 1988).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982). The remedy of petition for remission or mitigation was
previously a part of the customs law (19 U.S.C. § 5297). Section 1963(c) transferred certain
functions under that law to the Attorney General, including the authority to decide mitigation
and remission of forfeiture. The Department of Justice had opposed judicial resolution of third
party claims, but, prior to the enactment of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, changed its
position and supported the addition of a hearing procedure subsequent to the order of forfeiture. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 207. A.B.A. Report, supra note 9, app. D at 43.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l) (Supp. V 1988).
43. As amended, section 1963(I) provides that, following the entry of an order of forfeiture, the government must publish notice or provide direct notice to any person "known to
have alleged an interest" in the property in question. Third parties alleging an interest may,
within thirty days, petition for a hearing before the court alone, to be held within (if practicable) thirty days of the petition. Petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that his title was superior to the defendant's, or that petitioner was a bona fide purchaser.
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instituting any civil action to clear his title during the pendency of
the criminal case." Thus, although third parties now have an opportunity for a judicial resolution of their claims, that opportunity
comes only after their property has been restrained. The due process
rights of third party property owners are still threatened.
D.

The Criminal Forfeiture Problem

The 1984 amendments to the RICO statute provide that title to
forfeitable property vests in the United States at the time the defendant commits the predicate acts;"6 i.e., vesting of title relates back
to the date the underlying crime was committed and the property
owner is deemed to have lost title to that property as of that date.
This relation-back concept suggests the same "taint" theory that was
at the root of historical in rem forfeiture. 4" Taint means that the
property itself is somehow tainted, or guilty, and may be seized, regardless of the guilt or innocence of its owner.4 7 It is a legal fiction
used to justify the forfeiture of property that has been used in the
commission of a crime. 48 However, it belies Congress' stated intention that the forfeiture be a criminal penalty against the defendant. 4"
Restraint and forfeiture can effectively penalize any third party with
an interest in the forfeitable property, innocent or not. Despite the
unfairness of in rem forfeiture, one of the justifications given for its
continued use was the theory that "confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing [lessors, bailors or secured creditors] to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property."5 0 This
rationale only makes sense when applied to the illegal use of property by one who is not the owner, but to whom the owner has entrusted his property. It cannot reasonably be applied to a purchaser
or legitimate transferee when the illegal use of the property was by
the prior owner. There is no deterrent in a penalty imposed on an
owner after the fact, unless it is to deter innocent purchasers from
buying property without conducting a complete investigation of the
seller, which is unreasonable."1 The inherent unfairness of the rela44.
intervene
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

18 U.S.C. § 1963(i) sets forth the "recognized principle" that third parties may not
in the criminal case. S.REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 206.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. V 1988).
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 200.
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684.
Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 193.
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
In large commercial transactions, it is reasonable to expect that a purchaser would
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tion-back concept reflects the unjust nature of ex post facto laws,
which are constitutionally barred. 2
The legislative history of the 1984 amendments to the Organized Crime Control Act acknowledge that section 1963(c), which
vests title to forfeited property in the United States at the time the
underlying offense is committed, is a codification of the "taint" theory heretofore attached to in rem forfeiture." The statute therefore
gives prosecutors the best of both worlds - in personam jurisdiction
and in rem forfeiture. The "relation back" concept, virtually
preempts an otherwise legitimate transfer of property unless the
buyer can prove that he had no reason to know that the property
might be subject to forfeiture."
Courts have widely disagreed over the nature of criminal forfeiture. The District Court in United States v. Ambrosio"5 held "the
innocence of a third party in an in personam forfeiture proceeding is
a valid defense." ' 56 Compare the language in Ambrosio to that of
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,5 7 a seminal case on in
rem forfeiture in which the Supreme Court held that "the innocence
of the owner of the property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense."6 8 The decision in United States
v. Thevis" is illustrative: the Court assumed that "the forfeiture authorized by RICO is, like traditional in rem action, limited to interest or property rights put to an illegal use under 18 U.S.C. § 1962.60
However, the Thevis decision was rendered in 1979, before Congress
expanded the definition of assets to include all fruits of the illegal
conduct. Since profits derived from illegal activity are not the same
as property used in the illegal activity, this comparison to in rem
conduct a costly investigation of the seller. However, for the average individual or small commercial enterprise, the cost of such an investigation would not always be feasible. The threat of
eventual forfeiture may thus have a chilling effect on commerce. People will be deterred from
purchasing property or interests in property by the high cost of adequately investigating the
background of the sellers.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. it is generally agreed that the relation back concept of
section 1963(c), as it applies to the defendant, does not constitute an ex post facto enactment.
United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Crozier II]. See
also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (D. Colo. 1985).
53. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 200.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), (I) (Supp. V 1988).
55. 575 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
56. Id. at 552.
57. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
58. Id. at 683.
59. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
60. Id. at 141 n.10.
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forfeiture is no longer valid.
Like the court in Thevis, other courts have found little or no
difference between criminal and civil forfeiture."1 These Courts are
disregarding the unique nature of criminal forfeitures. Criminal forfeiture gives the government jurisdiction wherever the defendant
may be tried,"2 not necessarily where the property is located, as in
the case of civil forfeiture." Also in criminal forfeiture, no third
party may intervene or institute a separate action to assert his property rights during the criminal prosecution. 4 Traditional in rem proceedings impose none of these limitations on property owners.
E. RICO Forfeiture Procedure
While federal prosecutors enjoy much discretion in their use of
the RICO statutes, they are subject to some limitations. First, a
United States Attorney is not free to file a RICO case without first
obtaining approval from the Department of Justice Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section.65 In order to obtain forfeiture of any
property, the property must be described in the indictment.66 This
means that a grand jury must have determined that there was probable cause to believe that the property will be forfeitable upon the
conviction of the defendant. The prosecutor's motion for a restraining order may be made immediately after the indictment is returned by the grand jury. 7 The statute does not require notice of the
motion to either the defendant or any third party with an interest in
the property. The motion is argued in an ex parte proceeding before
a judge, much like the proceeding for a civil temporary restraining
order. 66 When it is made known to the court that a third party holds
title to or is in possession of certain of the forfeitable assets, the
judge should fully question the prosecutor regarding the burdens be61. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980), held
"in rem forfeitures, though nominally against inanimate objects, impose penalties upon persons
[citations omitted], and the fact that the proceeding is in personam rather than in rem seems
of little significance." Id. at 1039. In United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), the
court dismissed any variation between the types of action, stating "[alt least for this purpose,
there is no substantial difference between an in rem proceeding and a forfeiture proceeding
brought directly against the owner." Id. at 397.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(j) (Supp. V 1988).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(i) (Supp. V 1988).
65. RICO Manual, supra note 27, at 127.
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988).
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
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ing placed on that third party. 69 The ex parte nature of the proceeding, however, gives the prosecutor full responsibility for accurately
presenting the facts to the judge and to the grand jury. This situation creates a potential conflict of interest for the prosecutor: in a
RICO forfeiture action, it is the goal of the prosecution to obtain
restraint and eventual forfeiture; but, at the same time, the prosecutor will recognize that full disclosure of third party interests in the
property to be forfeited is contrary to his goals.
Congress was aware of the prosecutor's conflict of interest in
RICO forfeiture proceedings:
Where it is clear that a forfeitable asset has been sold for value to
an innocent purchaser, the Committee expects that the government
would seek forfeiture of substitute assets of the defendant, as provided in § 1963(d), at the conclusion of trial and avoid the necessity of the purchaser petitioning for a post-trial hearing."
Regrettably, this caveat is buried in a footnote in the Senate Report.
Congress may have expected the prosecutor not to abuse his discretion in seeking forfeiture of property known to be in the hands of a
bona fide purchaser or other legitimate assets. From this statement
in the Senate Report, it is clear that Congress would not have
wanted the prosecutor to waste government resources and court time
pursuing ends that are not clearly within the scope of the statute.7 1
The prosecutor's ethical duty as an officer of the court must also
weigh heavily in his decision whether or not to seek forfeiture.7 2

II. THE DUE PROCESS PROBLEM
It is fundamental to our system of justice that the government
should not be allowed to seize a person's property without giving him
an opportunity to contest the seizure." Existing RICO legislation
fails to provide for the due process rights of third parties and the
69. A.B.A. Report, supra note 9, app. D. at 43.
70. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 16, at 201 n.29.
71. But cf United States v. Reckmeyer, 627 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Va. 1986) [hereinafter
Reckmeyer I] and United States v. Reckmeyer, 628 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Va. 1986) [hereinafter Reckmeyer II]. In Reckmeyer i, a third party had sold cattle to the defendant and was still
owed a large balance on them. The prosecutor sought forfeiture of the cattle despite the obvious claim of the third party. Barry Tarlow, in IV RICO Law Reporter at 497 (1986), comments that "[t]he third party in Reckmeyer I presented such a strong case that it is difficult to
understand why the prosecution contested the issue."
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5)

(1980).
73.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1982).
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denial of due process is a constitutional violation. 4
The courts have had to grapple with due process problems
throughout the history of RICO legislation. Prior to the 1984
amendments to the statute, many courts assumed that a prompt

post-restraint hearing was necessary in RICO forfeitures, although
75
such a restriction was not explicitly included in the legislation.
Courts viewed restraining orders in RICO criminal actions as similar

to civil restraining orders and, because they had always required
prompt post-restraint hearings for civil restraining orders, they re-

quired the same in criminal forfeitures under RICO.7 6 During this
period, more than one court read into the statute a requirement for a
prompt post-restraint hearing rather than be forced to decide on the
statute's constitutionality.7 7 Since the 1984 amendments, and in the
face of the clear intent of Congress to omit post-indictment, pre-trial
restraint hearings,7 8 courts still require such hearings for both defendants and third party property owners.79 As a further indication
of the judiciary's concern with the statute, third parties have even
been allowed to file interlocutory appeals on restraining orders affecting them,80 which is in direct contrast to the purpose of the
74. U.S. CONST., amend V.
75. See supra note 30.
76. Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 246 ("It may well be that the courts have looked to the
familiar rules of civil procedure because no other standards have been suggested.").
77. Id. at 244-45; see supra note 30.
78. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 206. Third party participation in the pre-trial
forfeiture proceeding is prohibited by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(0 (Supp. V 1988). However,
the statute expressly provides for third party participation if the restraint is prior to indictment, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1988), which makes significant its omission in the
post-indictment proceeding.
79. See e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Forfeiture
Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988); Crozier !!, 777
F.2d at 1376 ("The statutory forfeiture provisions [of 21 U.S.C. § 853] do not satisfy due
process."); Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1332; United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. at 1512
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
In United States v. Thier, the Fifth Circuit insisted that the literal language of the statute
does not preclude hearings for "preliminary injunctions," as it does for "restraining orders,"
and that the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was still appropriate. 801
F.2d 1463, 1469 (5th Cir. 1986). The court in Rogers strained as hard as the Fifth Circuit in
Thier to construe the statute in a way to allow for a post-deprivation hearing without finding
the statute unconstitutional. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1343.
80. United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988). The case involves a RICO
action against various individuals and entities that are partners in Princeton/Newport Partners, L.P. (the first RICO action taken against an investment partnership). The limited partnership was the third party in possession of property being restrained as a part of the criminal
action. The government initially obtained restraint of all of the assets of the limited partnership, the third party appealed, and the case was remanded to limit restraint to the defendant's
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statute.
A.

What Constitutes a Deprivation

The due process analysis can be divided into two parts: (1) what
constitutes a deprivation, and (2) what is required to satisfy due
process.
It is well settled that actual seizure of property without notice
or an opportunity to be heard is unconstitutional.8 " Deprivation that
is either temporary or partial is also prohibited by the fifth amendment."' It logically follows that restraint of property is a deprivation
in this context.83
The nature of the property being restrained, the severity of the
restraining order, and the length of delay between restraint and the
opportunity to be heard are factors which should be considered in
any RICO due process analysis. Restraint under RICO refers to the
temporary freezing of assets. Assets that may be restrained include
cash, stocks, real estate, personal property or partnership interests.8 "
A restraining order may bar the transfer of property without
court permission;8 5 it may also include a bar to any use of the property, including the income generated from it." Further, it may result
in government control of a business or labor union during the pendency of the criminal action. 7 A restriction against the sale of one's
property may mean the inability to obtain funds for payment of
taxes as well as living expenses." Furthermore, the specter of forfeiture of attorney's fees may deter defense attorneys from taking on
cases for RICO defendants. As a result of this, RICO defendants
interests in the partnership or, alternatively, to direct the posting of a bond, if that would be
less burdensome on the partnership.
81. Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67; Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
82. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606 (1975): Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 85: Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
83. See Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617: Veon, 549 F.2d at 244-45.
84. In Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512, a portion of the restrained assets were shares in
General Dynamics Corporation; real property was restrained in Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74; in
Regan, 858 F.2d 115, the property was the defendant's interest in a limited partnership.
85. See, e.g., Musson, 802 F.2d at 386.
86. See. e.g.. Crozier 1, 674 F.2d at 1297. Restraint of virtually all of the defendant's
property left them with no income with which to pay living expenses or the cost of litigation,
and resulted in foreclosure of at least part of their real property.
87. The availability of equitable remedies in civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982),
sometimes makes it more useful to the government than the more-limited criminal forfeiture of
section 1963.
88. Crozier 1, 674 F.2d at 1297.
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may be denied their sixth amendment rights. s9 Restraint of a de-

fendant's sole source of income has been denied as unreasonable as
well as unconstitutional.9"

The severity of the restraint and the nature of the property are
not the only factors that should be taken into account in determining
whether a due process violation exists. The length of time that the
restraint will remain in effect should also be a factored into this
analysis. Conviction or acquittal in a typical RICO trial may take
months or even years.' 1 However, courts have held that any party
asserting a lack of due process on the grounds of such a delay must
show that he would be injured by the delay. 9" RICO prosecutions are
often extremely complex and may take a long time to resolve. They
may involve multiple defendants," intricate securities transactions,9
or large corporations. 5 The complexity of these cases often produces
extraordinary delays, but a delay alone is not sufficient to assert a
due process violation without proof of concomitant injuries.9
Once the extent of the restraint being requested is known, a balancing test can be used; the courts can weigh the injury or burden on

the property owner against the interest of the party requesting the
restraint.' 7 Restraining the sale of one's property without court approval is enough to raise a deprivation issue. 98 However, the deprivation might be considered minimal when weighed against the govern89. See generally Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74; Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637. On March
21, 1989, the United States Supreme Court heard these cases in tandem for the purpose of
ruling on the fifth and sixth amendment claims in each.
90. Crozier 1, 674 F.2d at 1297. See supra note 75.
91. Crozier I!, 777 F.2d 1376 (over five years since the indictment and criminal case not
yet resolved). But see United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (five months
not too long given the facts of the case).
92. United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in
United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (A delay of eighteen months between a seizure
under customs law and the institution of forfeiture proceedings was found not to be violative of
due process in the face of valid government reasons for the delay and lack of prejudice to the
interested party. This case has come to stand for the requirement that a claimant assert loss or
prejudice before a finding of lack of due process can be made). See also Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
at 1335 ("There is no need to adjudicate the hypothetical claims of third parties which may
never arise.").
93. See. e.g., United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (case
involved 24 defendants and a 78-count indictment charging 80 separate acts of racketeering).
94. See, e.g., Regan, 858 F.2d 115.
95. See, e.g., Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512.
96. See supra note 92.
97. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971); Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d
578, 587 (5th Cir. 1980).
98. Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617; Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. at 1520.
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ment's interest in preserving the property for potential forfeiture. By
eliminating a third party's opportunity to be heard in a RICO prosecution, section 1963 implies that the government's interest always

prevails over any injury to a third party. Thus, the balancing test
ordinarily employed in due process analyses is disregarded in RICO
cases where third party property is forfeited. 99
B.

Satisfying Due Process

The notice requirement of due process should be "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pre-

sent their objection."' 100 The hearing component of procedural due

process is a more complex issue. A hearing should be held prior to
seizure,101 or at least in "a meaningful time and meaningful manner." 102 Neither notice nor the opportunity to be heard is afforded
third parties whose property is temporarily restrained under the Act.
RICO allows the government to obtain restraint of a third
party's property immediately after indictment of the defendant.'
The third party's opportunity to be heard, however, is postponed un-

til after the defendant's conviction.' 0 ' The provision for a post-conviction hearing does not satisfy the procedural requirements of the
fifth amendment as far as a third party is concerned.' 0 5 Due process
99. Another factor is the risk of erroneous deprivation. Crozier Ii, 777 F.2d at 1383-84;
Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 248. ("Complexity alone suggests a high degree of risk of error"). The
risk of error is a factor in determining the standard of proof to be applied at a hearing on the
matter. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 743, 761 (1982). In RICO forfeiture, the risk is multiplied by the third party's absence from the litigation.
100. Mullane v. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
101. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1982). Circumstances that constitute an exception to the requirements of procedural due process involve public interest or safety. Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 91; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 379. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring). In RICO prosecutions, it is in the public interest to prevent
the defendant from disposing of or concealing the assets. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d
1463 (5th Cir. 1986). There, the court stated:
The Government certainly has a valid interest in assuring that funds illegally obtained are not laundered or secreted between the time a defendant is indicted and
the time when his criminality is determined by actual conviction. This is sufficiently
important to weigh heavily in deciding what due process requires .. . . But due
process must be determined on a scale whose balances weigh both sides.
Id. at 1475 (concurring opinion). The forfeiture is not only an added penalty against the defendant, but also serves to remove a portion of organized crime's power base.
102. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (Supp. V 1988).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(i), (I)..
105. The Supreme Court has not "embraced the general proposition that a wrong may
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does not merely require notice and hearing at some indefinite future
date. One of the requirements is that a hearing be held within "a

meaningful time." '
In accordance with the constitutional mandate of a hearing
within a "meaningful time," the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require a hearing as soon as possible, even when circumstances require restraint prior to notice and opportunity to be heard.10 7 In a
non-RICO civil proceeding, an adversarial hearing would have to be
held within ten days of the issuance of a temporary restraining order, or the order would expire.10 8

In addition to its failure to satisfy the meaningful time requirements, the provision for an eventual post-conviction forfeiture proceeding' 09 does not withstand constitutional muster because it is not
conducted in a meaningful manner. First, the hearing does not address the issue of the temporary restraint of the third party's property; the only issue at the hearing is whether there will be a permanent forfeiture of the property." 0 In addition, the burden of proof at
the hearing rests upon the third party,"' who must establish, by a
be done if it can be undone." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
106. Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) provides that a Temporary Restraining Order "shall expire
by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days . . . . In case a temporary
restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set
down for a hearing at the earliest possible time ..
" See Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617; Veon, 538
F.Supp. at 243. It should be noted that § 1963 does not explicitly preclude a hearing subsequent to restraint, but the legislative history contemplates only such questions as whether the
property restrained was properly set out in the indictment. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at
203 ("However, it is stressed that at such a hearing the court is not to entertain challenges to
the validity of the indictment."). There is also a small ambiguous footnote in the Senate Report which appears to allow for an exception to third party not-intervention: "[Section 1963(i)]
is not intended to preclude a third party with an interest in property that is or may be subject
to a restraining order from participating in a hearing regarding that order, however." S. REP.
No. 225 at 206, n.42. Whether the hearing referred to is the type required for pre-indictment
restraint is not at all clear. Even if the hearing contemplated satisfies the "meaningful time"
requirement of due process, it cannot realistically be considered to be a "meaningful manner"
if only the technical requirements of the indictment are addressed. See generally Crozier II,
777 F.2d at 1383-84; Note, The Process Due Defendants, supra note 29, at 1179.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(I) (Supp. V 1988).
110. Crozier 1, 777 F.2d at 1384. See also United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th
Cir. 1987).
III. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6). See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 551 (one of the factors in the
determination that the hearing was not conducted in a meaningful manner was the fact that
the burden of proof was on the petitioner). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525
(1958) ("it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome."); the
rationale for placing the burden on the third party petitioner is that the jury has already found
the property forfeitable, beyond a reasonable doubt, in the criminal proceeding. S. REP. No.
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preponderance of the evidence, that he is a bona fide purchaser." '
While the statute explicitly bars intervention or other action by

third parties during the pendency of the criminal trial,113 one court

has required a pre-trial hearing at the request of a third party. " 4

Some courts have not allowed the criminal defendant to assert the
rights of the third party property owner." 5 Even if a court were to
permit a defendant to assert the rights of the third party, the defend-

ant may not always act to protect the interests of the injured third
party. Furthermore, there may be a conflict of interest between the
interests of the defendant and the third party. For example, a defendant in a criminal RICO action may concede to the government's
restraint of property belonging to a third party, in order to better his

own position. This is conceivable where a RICO defendant knows of
property that is in the hands of a third party and is reachable under
the statute; here, the defendant could identify that property to the
prosecution instead of losing property of his own. " 6
Due process is basically a question of fairness. In addition to the

unfairness of restraining a person's property without notice and an
opportunity to be heard, there is an additional element of unfairness
where a court issues a temporary restraining order in sole reliance on
an indictment. The third party is being penalized without ever hav-

ing been charged with a crime.
225, supra note 16, at 209. The question is whether this finding is meaningful when an interested party may not ever have been heard.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l). The content of the hearing is set by statute, and the third
party is limited to arguing only that he is a bona fide purchaser; he may not seek to establish
that the forfeiture is improper for other reasons. But see, Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 64243 (attorneys for the defendant, acting on their own behalf as interested third parties, allowed
to assert defendant's sixth amendment rights).
113. Section 1963(i) sets forth the "recognized principle" that third parties may not
intervene in the criminal case. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 206.
114. United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
115. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1335 (In the context of a RICO forfeiture, there is not
"basis to presume that defendants will be more effective advocates than the third parties themselves."). Jus tertii is the general prohibition against a party to the action asserting the rights
of non-parties. It does not have its basis in the constitution, but is a "prudential doctrine"
created by the courts to promote judicial economy and efficiency. Where its justifications are
inapplicable and there is a special relationship between the party to the action and the third
party, it is not rigidly applied. Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d
328, 333 (5th Cir. 1981). The jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals concerning restraining
orders in RICO cases was settled in Crozier 1, 674 F.2d at 1296; United States v. Ferrantino,
738 F2d 109 (6th Cir. 1983); Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 616.
116. If the government cannot trace property in the hands of a third party, they may
request forfeiture of substitute assets still in the hands of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(n)
(Supp. V 1988).

19881

RICO FORFEITURE

Prior to an application for a restraining order, a grand jury
must have found that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
was committed, that the defendant committed it, and that the property is subject to forfeiture.' 17 However, the third party with an interest in the property has not been indicted; there is no finding of
probable cause to believe that the third party is guilty of anything,
that he is an accomplice of the defendant, or that the transfer of
property by the defendant to the third party was in any way fraudulent."' Consequently, a third party whose -property is being restrained has less protection than the defendant in the underlying
RICO prosecution.
Not only is a third party barred from being heard until the order of forfeiture is entered subsequent to conviction, but he is then
forced to take the initiative and petition for a hearing. Furthermore,
at the hearing he bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his title was superior to the defendant's
and that he had no reason to believe that the property in question
might be forfeitable." 9 Only then can the third party defeat the government's claim to the property. Thus, even if the court grants a
timely hearing to the defendant, the third party is still denied his
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and meaningful
manner.
C.

Inadequate Protectionfor the Bona Fide Purchaser

The clearest example of an innocent third party who may be
harmed by the RICO forfeiture provisions is the bona fide purchaser.
The statute defines a bona fide purchaser as one who has bought
potentially forfeitable property for valid consideration, not having
any reason to know that the property might be subject to forfeiture.1 20 Section 1963(c) vests title in the government at the time of
the commission of the predicate offense,12 1 which can occur well
before the investigation and indictment of the defendant. If the de117.

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 7.

118. One commentator has offerred the opinion that "an innocent party who becomes
involved in the affairs of organized crime is probably not wholly innocent and may be considered as having 'assumed the risk.'" Note, RICO Forfeiture and the Rights of Innocent Third
Parties, 18 CAL. W.U.L. REV. 345, 358 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Innocent Third Parties]. It
is doubtful that there are many legislators willing to go on record as supporting that opinion,
but it may not be an isolated one.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(I)(6).

120. Id. § .1963(l)(6)(B).
121. Id. § 1963(c).
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fendant sells, assigns or transfers his interest in the property to a
third party subsequent to the predicate act, the government can still
obtain temporary restraint of that property. The innocent third party
who has obtained property from the defendant may lose his rights in
that property unless he can prove, at a post-conviction forfeiture
hearing, that he had no reason to know of the government's interest.
Not only must the purchaser establish that he gave value for the
property, but he is also required to prove that he did not know or
have reason to know the seller was under investigation for a RICO2
12
violation, and that the property was therefore subject to forfeiture.
At the post-conviction proceeding, in order to retain control of the
forfeited property, the government does not have to prove that the
third party was guilty of anything. The bona fide purchaser bears the
burden of proving that he isn't guilty of participating in a fraudulent
transfer, and also that he had no reason to suspect that the property
he obtained might be implicated in a RICO prosecution. Given the
complexity of the RICO forfeiture provisions, it is unreasonable for
the government to require that all innocent purchasers, acting in
good faith, be familiar with all prior owners and the rippling effect
of their conduct on the property that is purchased from them. 23
The RICO statutes ignore any presumption that the holder of
legal title might reasonably expect. It is not unreasonable for the
title holder to expect that, where he has purchased the property for
value and in good faith, any one who wishes to challenge his title
would have the burden of going forward with such an action. For
example, in a civil action to set aside a transfer as a fraudulent conveyance, the burden to initiate the action and prove the transfer
fraudulent is on the party advocating the change in the status quo. 2 ,
Even in a civil forfeiture proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, the
government bears the burden of proof.1 25 It is only in a post-convic122. Id. § 1963(1).
123. "To place upon the unwitting or average human being the ability to parse through
that language and to prove that he parsed through the language and did not, in fact understand that it was property subject to forfeiture may be a little more bit than the Constitution
can stand." A.B.A. Report, supra note 9, app. D at 43. Although ignorance of the law is
generally not a defense to criminal conduct, United States v. International Minerals & Chemicals Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971), a third party property owner in a RICO case is not
charged with a crime.
124. Outside of bankruptcy, actions to set aside transfers of property are governed by
state law. New York, for example, follows the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. N.Y.
DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270 et. seq. (McKinneys 1988); Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
U.L.A. vol.7a (1985).
125. See United States v. Local 560, IBT, 581 F. Supp. 279, 327 (D.N.J. 1984), af'd,
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tion forfeiture hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1) or its drug-offense
counterpart, 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) that the bona fide purchaser must
be the moving party. The statutes thus create a new presumption
that title to potentially forfeitable property in such cases vests in the
United States, even though the owner of record has not yet been
given an opportunity to be heard."
D.

Other Parties Caught Up By RICO Prosecutions

While the most blatant lack of due process attaches to the
plight of the bona fide purchaser, other forms of property rights are
endangered by the RICO forfeiture provisions.
Rights in community property or marital assets may be subject
to RICO forfeiture. In United States v. L'Hoste,2 7 the court rejected the defendant's argument that his wife's share of community
property could not be forfeited. The court found that the defendant
could not argue his wife's claim and that she was limited to the statutory remedy of petitioning the Attorney General for mitigation (the
only remedy for third parties prior to the 1984 amendments to the
Act).
A more complex question of marital rights in forfeitable property arose in FDIC v. United States,2 8 where the United States Attorney, the Internal Revenue Service, and the former wife of a
RICO defendant were all competing for a cash surplus from the
FDIC's sale of foreclosed property belonging to the defendant. The
defendant had previously transferred the second mortgage on the
property to a trust to secure alimony payments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had a tax lien on the same funds, and the United
States government claimed the funds pursuant to a prior order of
forfeiture under the RICO statutes.1 2 9 The transfer of the second
mortgage was held to be a fraudulent attempt to hide the assets. The
wife's claim was not ripe, whereas the claims of the U.S. government
and the IRS were recorded judgments. 1 0 It is not being argued here
780 F.2d 267, cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 2247.
126. The parallel CCE statute explicitly provides for another presumption. Any assets in
the defendant's possession immediately following the criminal act are presumed to be the fruits
of that conduct, unless the defendant can establish that the assets came from another source.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 212.
127. 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1980).
128. 654 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
129. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
130. FDIC v. United States, 654 F. Supp. at 812-13. The wife also contended that she
was a bona fide purchaser, but the court rejected that argument, noting that she was aware of
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that a spouse should be able to protect her partner's illegally obtained assets from forfeiture; however, a spouse may be an unwitting
victim and should be given a timely opportunity to be heard on their

claims.
Other parties who may be caught up in the wake of a RICO
forfeiture are those who share an interest in forfeitable property with
a RICO defendant, e.g., joint tenants or tenants in common.13 ' For
example, in order to divest the defendant of his interest in a jointlyheld property, the property itself may have to be liquidated or subdi-

vided, regardless of the intentions or desires of the joint tenants. This
may adversely affect the value of the property by bringing a reduced

price at a distress sale, thus causing harm to an innocent third party
who had the misfortune to share a property interest with the RICO
defendant.
Even a secured interest is not altogether secure from the reach
of a RICO forfeiture. 3 2 A secured creditor who makes a loan to a
person who becomes involved in a RICO forfeiture may lose the collateral upon which the loan is made. Here, the vast reach of the
RICO statute is apparent: anyone who holds a security interest in
property may lose their interest in that property simply because the

person who holds it has been caught in the broad sweep of a RICO
prosecution. 3 3 In view of the large number of persons and business
entities holding secured interests in real and personal property, any
threat to the sanctity of those interests could seriously impede the
availability of credit. Where creditors fear seizure of their collateral
by RICO prosecutors, they may ultimately resort to charging exces-

sive prices for secured credit and may drive many needy borrowers
out of the market.
Some claimants have been held to have no "cognizable interest"
the federal criminal action prior to the transfer. Id. at 814.
131. Note, Innocent Third Parties, supra note 118, at 346.
132. E.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence, No. 88-0349 Civ. (S.D. Fla.
1988). See also, "A Loan Goes Up in Smoke" Time Magazine, August 8, 1988, at 31. The
Republic National Bank of Miami is suing for recovery of a mortgage it held on property
seized and sold by the United States government pursuant to the Drug Forfeiture Statutes.
While such mortgages are usually paid off, the U.S. Attorney in this case is arguing that the
bank knew it was dealing with a drug trafficker when it approved the mortgage. The seizure
was pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) (1982).
In FDIC v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 794, judgement creditors found that they had to
compete with the U.S. government for the defendant's assets. See supra note 130.
133. Even if the debtor is not indicted in the RICO suit or is not affiliated with the
criminal defendant, the secured creditor risks losing its interest.
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in forfeitable property. In United States v. Mageean,1 34 at a postconviction hearing to determine third party claims, air crash victims
with pending suits against a corporation wholly owned by the RICO
defendant were found to have no remedy as the crash occurred after
the criminal act. Unsecured trade creditors, however, were found to
have cognizable interests as bona fide purchasers. 35
Defense attorneys have discovered that their fees are no longer
assured where their client's property is subject to forfeiture under
RICO. Until 1987, the circuits had been consistent in holding that
the sixth amendment precluded forfeiture of funds paid for defense
counsel, except in cases where the defendant had made a bad faith
transfer for the purpose of concealing assets or protecting them from
forfeiture. " 6 In December of 1987, a panel of the Second Circuit
speculated that the courts that had interpreted the statute to exempt
legitimate attorney's fees from the reach of RICO forfeiture had
done so in order to avoid confronting the sixth amendment right to
counsel issue. " The panel also found that the legislation provided
no exemption for attorney's fees, but remanded for a hearing in order to satisfy the due process requirements. 1 8 Although forfeiture
would have rendered the defendant indigent, the trial court refused
to vacate the restraining order. 3 9 In a rehearing en banc, the court
of appeals reversed, directing that funds be released to pay the defendant's attorney. "1 0
The Fourth Circuit, in In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered," " not only upheld the restraint placed on a fee
that had been paid to the defendant's tax attorneys, but upheld the
eventual forfeiture of that fee and rejected the claimant's petition for
134. 649 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D. Nev. 1986).
135. Id. at 831.
136. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v.
lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp.
194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1346-47 (D. Colo.
1985).
137. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
140. Id. at 1403. The Monsanto decision was based upon a variety of grounds. Three
Justices held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied on sixth amendment grounds.
Justice Oakes wrote a separate concurring opinion also citing lack of due process in that "pretrial forfeiture too closely resembles the Alice-in-Wonderland Queen's 'sentence first, verdict
afterward' mode of justice." Id. at 1404. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 109 S.Ct.
363 (1988), and the case was heard in tandem with Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
141. 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988). See supra note 79.
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the remainder owed. 4" The court of appeals held that an order of
forfeiture is limited only by the rights of third parties as those rights
are narrowly defined in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). 4 3 The Fifth and Tenth

Circuits have also heard similar claims and both have upheld the
constitutionality of the RICO forfeiture statute and its application to
attorney's fees.'4 The thrust of the controversy over attorney's fees,
however, is not the rights of a third party but the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel. This note is primarily concerned with

third party property rights in RICO forfeiture.
Given the nature of RICO cases, other potential third party
claimants might include parties with interests in the same enterprise

as the defendant; e.g., a partner in the defendant's business or shareholders in a corporation that is involved in a RICO suit.14 5 If organized crime has reached into the fabric of our economy as extensively
as the proponents of the statutes claim, then it is conceivable that,
without proper limitations, zealous enforcement of section 1963
could affect national defense, communications, health care, and
transportation industries by the threat of restraint or forfeiture of
1 46
large blocks or stock.
An entirely new development is the use of the RICO statute in
the securities industry. The first securities brokers indicted under
RICO were members of the firm Princeton/Newport Partners. 1 47 In
Regan, the government had sought to monitor the dealings of the
Princeton/Newport investment partnership and to restrain all of its
assets. The Second Circuit allowed the defendants to retain control
among themselves by posting a bond equal to the potential forfeiture
liability." 1 While the bond kept the government out of management,
142. Id. at 642. However, the court agreed that the attorneys had standing to argue the
defendant's right to counsel as opposed to being bound by the statutory limitations upon a
third party in a post-conviction hearing.
143. Id. at 649.
144. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones,
837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988).
145. A.B.A. Report, supra note 9, app. D at 45.
146. In United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. at 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1984, defendant Veliotis was on the Board of Directors of General Dynamics Corp., President and General Manager of its Quincy Division and General Manager of the Electronic Boat Division. He also
owned as much as 114,659 shares of General Dynamics stock.
147. United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
148. Provision for posting of a bond as an alternative to restraint may also be used in
United States v. Milken, where an indictment was returned by a grand jury on March 29,
1989, against Michael Milken and two other defendants who traded high yield ("junk") bonds
at Drexel, Burnham, Lambert. The case against Milken may produce the largest financial
penalty ever assessed against individuals; the United States Attorney could seek forfeiture of
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it still froze substantial assets of the firm, resulting in eventual
liquidation.
RECOMMENDATIONS

AND CONCLUSION

Any amendment to the Criminal Forfeiture Act that would
strengthen due process rights for third party property owners would
diminish the prosecutor's strength in fighting racketeers and other
criminals. There must be some attempt, however, to balance the
rights of unindicted third parties and the laudable goals of the Act.
Section 1963 itself might provide the answer. In allowing for preindictment restraining orders, Congress provided for temporary restraint similar to that of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which establishes guidelines for obtaining temporary restraining orders. In the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, Congress
provided for notice to be given to third parties with an interest in the
property.1 4 9 The same provision also allowed for the third party's
participation in the proceedings.1 50 The government must be able to
obtain a post-indictment temporary restraining order without warning to the defendant. That necessity is one of the "extraordinary exceptions" to the due process requirement of prior notice and opportunity to be heard.1 51 That, in itself, is not a violation of due process.
What the statute lacks is a provision that any such ex parte restraining order be temporary, limited to a reasonable length of time.
It should be extended only after an adversarial hearing is held at
which any third party with an interest in the property may be heard.
Section 1963(d)(1)(A) provides that a restraining order or injunction may be issued upon the filing of an indictment or information. There is no provision for a timely adversarial hearing. Further
conditions should be added to the statute; I propose the following
addition:
18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) ... Provided that,
(i) any ex parte temporary restraining order shall be effective for
no more than 90 days; and
(ii) a temporary injunction may be issued only upon notice to any
persons appearing who have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing at which such persons shall have an opportunity to be heard and hearsay evidence may be admitted; and
over $1.8
149.
150.
151.

billion on the RICO counts alone. N.Y. Times, March 30, 1989 at I, col. 6.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1988).
Id.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1982).
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(iii) the court determines that there is a substantial probability that
the United States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that
failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise
made unavailable for forfeiture; and
(iv) the need to preserve the property outweighs the hardship on
any party against whom the order is to be entered.
While the above changes in the Organized Crime Control Act
would require more time and effort on the part of prosecutors in
preparing for and conducting hearings, and some potentially forfeitable property might be allowed to fall through the RICO net, due
process rights of third parties will be better protected. Damage to
the goals of the statute could be minimized by allowing hearsay evidence to be introduced at the hearings. The important purposes advanced by the RICO legislation - dismantling organized crime by
stripping criminals of the assets used or obtained in their criminal
enterprise - must be balanced against constitutional protections,
and adjustments made to safeguard the property rights of third parties. While Congress has indicated that in personam forfeiture is entirely different from in rem forfeiture,15 2 the RICO statute and its
legislative history have unduly blurred those differences. Although
the 1984 amendments to the Organized Crime Control Act added
some judicial process for affected third parties, 5 3 courts have continued to demonstrate their concern for the lack of notice and opportunity to be heard in § 1963 cases. 5 If RICO and CCE forfeitures
are to be effective, and not eviscerated by courts rightfully concerned
with due process, the differences ought to be made clearer and adequate protections provided.
Third parties should be given notice and the right to be heard in
a post-restraint, pre-trial adversary hearing. Even if probable cause
is still the standard of proof and the rules of evidence suspended,
third party property owners should be given some opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and meaningful manner.
Margaret Mainusch

152.
153.
154.

S. REP. No. 225, supra note 16, at 193.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(I) (Supp. V 1988) (procedure for a post-conviction hearing).
See supra note 79.

